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President's Notes

S

orneone asked me recently if I
missed the Battle Force job
in the Mediterranean. The truthful
answer is that the pace and the excite
ment in Newport haven't given me
much opportunity to dwell on what I
might be missing elsewhere. The
Naval War College is the center of
important new Navy initiatives and
there is a lot going on. It began
with former CNO Admiral Torn
Hayward establishing our Strategic Studies Group in July 1981. It continues
with the formal designation of our War Gaming Center as the prime Navy
gaming facility. It has reached a crescendo with Admiral Jim Watkins'
decision to cut back the Navy training pipeline in order to free additional, highly
qualified officers for duty as students at the Naval War College.
This is my first "President's Notes," partly because of all this activity,
partly because I have been away talking to large and small groups of naval
officers both on East Coast and West Coast trips, perhaps twelve hundred or
so officers in all. In every case I have been telling them the story of what is
going on at Newport and how it affects them professionally. I have been
explaining Admiral Watkins' plans for this institution.
Those ideas have been promulgated in two Alna vs, one of 22 September
1982 and the other of 15 November 1982. Translated from goals into concrete
plans, they resulted in the input of officers into the program in February 1983,
for the first "post-command short course" of six weeks duration. This "short
course" was specifically designed to get us off to a fast start. Three more such
six-week courses are planned for the rest of this calendar year. Meanwhile,
inputs into the full, 10-rnonth course of post-commanders are being increased
systematically.
The students being sent to the short course, as the name suggests, are
officers who have just completed a successful tour in a command position.
They are given an intensive course which focuses on naval operations
with some admixture of strategy and defense decision-making. Within the
naval operations portion, heavy stress is put on war gaming, the practical
application phase.
A subset of the full academic year, the senior naval operations course,
which the successful post-commanders will take in increasing numbers, has
been carefully overhauled to do two things: to increase its emphasis on
viewing operational problems consistently from a four-star or joint or
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol36/iss3/32
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Surface Ship Survivability:
An Enduring Issue
by
Rear Admiral James A. Winnefeld, US Navy (Retired)

A

recurring theme in naval debate since the mid-19th century has been
.nthe vulnerability of warships in the face of the threats posed by new
weapons. In their day Sinope, Hampton Roads, Lissa, Tsushima, and Jutland
focused the attention of the public, as well as professional opinion, on the
subject. World War II and the development of nuclear weapons rekindled
this interest. From a historical perspective this interest appears to have been
most keen during a conflict following an extended period of peace during
which there was rapid development in naval weapons technology. Against
this background, the quest for "lessons learned"-or relearned-from the
Falkland episode of last year should not come as a surprise.
Ship sinking, in combat are dramatic events that capture the public
imagination. Such sinking,, as during the Falkland campaign, are particularly
dramatic to a public with a foreshortened historical perspective. The
vulnerability of naval and sea lift forces to air and submarine attack would not
have surprised those sailors whojourneyed to Malta, Murmansk, or Okinawa
some forty years ago. Similarly, the capabilities of naval forces to isolate a
battlefield or interrupt its lines of communication would not have surprised
the sailors. soldiers, and marines on either side of Bataan, Singapore, Saipan,
or Inchon. Although surprises may be few for the professional observer with
a longer perspective of the development of naval warfare, that is not to say
that a fundamental shift in the balance of ship vulnerability has not occurred
since the last major con!lict-even if one puts nuclear weapons effects aside.
Since recent data points are few, the Falkland experience offers a timely
opportunity to review the ell.during issue of surface ship survivability.
Survivability is not simply a question of proper ship construction, the
effectiveness of the installed weapons, and damage control training.
Survivability is critically related to the mission given to the ship in a
particular situation and to her tactical employment in conjunction with other
weapons. For example, the mission given the ship may not be the one for
which she was built. Sailors,just as soldiers and airmen, must fight with what
they have. In other cases a ship may be given a mission for which she was
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The Ultimate Trust: National
Self-Restraint as a Factor in War
by
Colonel Theodore L. Gatchel, US Marine Corps

An anti-nuclear movement appears to be raking America by storm. (n a

.l'1. short time, the movement progressed from resolutions at New
England town meetings and demonstrations at the launchings of nuclear
submarines to the point where it is influencing national policy makers, if not
national policy. Over a year ago seventeen US senators and more than one
hundred members of the House of Representatives called upon the Reagan
administration to negotiate a nuclear freeze with the Soviet Union, for
example, and about the same time four nationally known policy makers from
previous administrations published an article recommending that the United
States declare a policy of no first use of nuclear weapons ln Europe. 1 Even
Admiral Rickover, father of the nuclear submarine, and Dr. Samuel Cohen,
Rickover's counterpart with respect to the neutron bomb, have recently
expressed second thoughts regarding the wisdom of employing the weapons
they worked so hard to create. 2
The nature of this anti-nuclear movement is so diverse that it defies
accurate definition. The individuals involved include pacifists and others
who oppose nuclear weapons on moral grounds; radicals searching for a
chance to discomfit the United States; and serious strategic thinkers who
believe that reliance on nuclear deterrence, the effectiveness of which is
uncertain at best. is a shaky foundation on which to rest our nation's security.
In spite of the great diversity of motivation. several common themes seem to
unite these individuals, at least loosely. One is the belief that nuclear war is
both imminent and unsurvivable. The hands of the ominous Doomsday Clock
of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, for example, are closer to the hour of
doom than they have been since the Cuban missile crisis. The issue of
survivability has also been discussed in a wide variety of recent articles and
books, many of which depict any employment ofnuclear weapons as leading
inexorably to the complete destruction of the human race. Another
characteristic found among many anti-nucle ar activists is the reluctance to
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol36/iss3/32
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French Defense Policy
by

S

Steven T. Ross
peaking at the Ecole Militaire on 3 November 1959, President Charles

de Gaulle said that the Fifth Republic "had as its raison d'etre ... the
defense of the nation's independence and integrity. It is necessary that the
defense of France be French." He went on to explain that while the Republic
remained loyal to the Atlantic alliance the nation would not place life or
death decisions in the hands of others. States had the right and the obligation
to exercise sovereign choice in matters of vital· national interest.
De Gaulle realized that in order to restore French status as a major power
he would have to end the Algerian war and complete decolonialization, The
requirements of colonial warfare had drastically limited the Fourth
Republic's diplomatic and military options. Determined to escape from this
trap, de Gaulle moved quickly to conclude the conflict in Algeria and granted
independence to most French African colonies.
Simultaneously, he sought to restructure the Atlantic alliance to provide
France with a larger independent role. In September 1958, he sent a memo to
President Eisenhower proposing an arrangement wherein the United States,
Great Britain, and France would coordinate global strategy and nuclear
policy. At a press conference in 1960, he again advocated that America,
England, and France take joint decisions on global problems.
When the Americans rejected his overtures, he turned his attention to an
effort to reorder bloc politics. He criticized the bipolar global balance as
dangerous since Americ an-Soviet rivalry automatically transformed local
issues around the world into major confrontations. He also raised serious
questions about Washington's resolve to defend Europe, pointing out that as
Soviet nuclear capability grew there would be growing reluctance on the
part of American leaders to place their homeland at risk to protect allies. The
American policy of flexible response was in fact an effort to confine a central

front war to Europe thus sparing American cities from nuclear destruction.
De Gaulle's solution was to create a French-led third force in Europe
which could act as an interlocator between the superpowers. In pursuit of this
goal he signed a treaty with the Federal Republic of Germany in 1963 which
included provisions for regular me etings of the heads of state as well as
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol36/iss3/32
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A Naval Sieve: The Union Blockade
in the Civil War
by
William N. Still, Jr.

A navy imposes a blockade in order to isolate the enemy, or some part of
.l'1.his territory, from the rest of the world. In most wars the side with
the stronger fleet tries to blockade the other side. Thus, the British Navy has
blockaded among others, France, the United Stares, Germany, and most
recently the Argentine forces in the Falkland Islands. The United States Navy
has blockaded Mexico, the Confederacy, the Spanish forces in Cuba, Japan,
and briefly, North Vietnam.
Blockade has been hailed by those who have used it, or wish to employ it
anew for some current conflict; it has been reviled by its victims. When we
look at its results we find that it has been useful. However, it has not always
had the influence with which it is often credited. The American Civil War in
1861~1865 is a good example.
Historians generally agree that the Union navy's major task in the Civil
War was the establishment and maintenance of the blockade. This was
determined on 19 April 1861, when Lincoln proclaimed a naval blockade
against the seceded states. His navy's secondary tasks included the protection
of American foreign commerce and the support of land operations, Both the
blockade and support o f land operations would necessitate combined
operations, including amphibious operations, against the Confederate states.
In his first annual report, for 1861, the Union Secretary of the Navy, Gideon
Welles, listed these tasks:
"1. The closing of all the insurgent ports along a coast of nearly three
thousand miles, in the form and under the exacting regulations of an
international blockade, including the naval occupation and defense of the
Potomac River , .. ,
"2. The organization of combined naval and military expeditions to operate in
force against various points of the southern coast, rendering efficient nava1
cooperation with the position and movements of such expeditions when landed,
and including also alt needful naval aid to the army in cutting intercommunication
with the rebels and in its operation., on the Mississippi and its tributaries; and
"3. The active pursuit of the piratical cruis,m which might escape the
vigilance of the blockading force , ... "
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The Soviet Union
and the Falklands War
by
Vojtech Masmy

T

he 1982 conflict between Great Britain and Argentina was the first

time that a Nato power, other than the United States, tested itself in combat

since France had lost the Algerian war twenty years before. The
campaign in the South Atlantic involved predominantly sea power-the
element of military might in which the Soviet Union had been investing
vigorously. A clash between two of America's friends in a region of great
political instability, the crisis offered apparent opportunities for expansion of
Soviet influence at the expense of the United States. For both military and
political reasons, therefore, Moscow was bound to follow the Falklands
drama with keen interest.

Like the rest of the world, the Soviet Union was initially caught by surprise
at the Argentine seizure of the islands on 2 April. The Marxist conceptual
framework, through which Moscow still tends to interpret world events,
could not supply a plausible explanation for a conflict between two
conservative capitalist governments half around the globe away from each

other, nor could it provide a ready guide for action. As a Soviet journal later
philosophically observed, this was a "strange war," showing how "unreliable
and fragile is the peace which exists on earth. "1 The one material stake that
the Soviet Union had in Argenrina-to insure for itself continued supply of
Argentine grain-was unlikely to be seriously affected regardless of the
outcome of the dispute. The initial response of the Soviet Union and its allies
to the bizarre case of aggression that had taken place in one of the world's
most remote corners was therefore ambivalent,

Looking for some plausible, albeit unproven, causes of the conflict, early
Soviet commentaries dwelt on presumed strategic importance of the islands
and the supposedly fabulous oil riches hidden underneath the surrounding

waters, 2 In contrast. the Havana television on 7 April made the more

pertinent comment that Argentina's anti-communist rulers had seized the
Co pyribid
by Vojtech
Mastny trying to divert
Falklands in a desperate
domestic
popularity,
ght@for1983
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Two Routes to the Wrong Destination:
Public Affairs in the South Atlantic War
by
Lieutenant Commander Arthur A. Humphries, US Navy

T he conflict in the South Atlantic in mid-1982 between Argentina and
.I.. Great Britain offers us the opportunity to examine news management

and its effects on public opinion in a crisis. This undeclared limited war for
the Falkland Islands, or Malvinas, also provides us with a classic view of the
differences in public information policies in an authorita'rian government and
in a democratic society. My intent is not to discuss the morality of
propaganda, sophism, or blatant lying by a government in a crisis bur to
account for its existence and explain why and bow it happens, along with the
less oblique problems of misinformation and speculation.
There has been a tendency in the wake of the crisis to compare the public
affairs or news aspects to America's experiences in the Vietnam conflict. J
don't think that Vietnam provides an apt comparison. While both Vietnam
and the Falklands were limited wars, there were too many dissimilarities to
allow for historical analogy, especially in the area of public information.
There was a great deal of time for the US Military Assistance Command in
Vietnam and the government back home to plan and set up facilities for the
press corps in Vietnam. The news media also had a great deal of time to
develop attitudes about, and strategies for, approaching that particular crisis.
There was no such urgency in Vietnam as we saw in the South Atlantic. But
there was one striking similarity-the capability for immediate mass
communication.
Mass Communirntions. There was the potential in the South Atlantic to show
the folks back home a vivid, real-life, real-time picture of men from two
opposing nations on two ordinary and theretofore unimportant islands doing
some very permanent, ugly things to each other. After the Vietnam Tet
Offensive of 1968, the American public, and for that matter the whole world,
saw a sample of South Vietnamese-style capital punishment-a real
execution of an enemy soldier, via their television sets in their own homes.
That isnot the sort of thing that would engender support at home for a war. If
you want to maintain popular support for a war, your side mustnot be seen as
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The Military in the Post-Vietnam Era:
A Search for Relevance
by
Major Lawrence B. Wilkerson, US Army

D

"And we are here as on a darkling plain
Swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight,
Where ignorant armies clash by night."
establishment
uring World War II the American military
Matthew
Arnold consum
mated an evolutionary process: it became a contradiction. It

became so in much the same fashion as the ideas of equality and liberty are a
contradiction: deeply, disturbingly, and disharmonically. Since that tran
sition period-called by Russell Weigley the passage from "frontier
constabulary" to userious competitor of European armies long accustomed
to international contests on a grand scale"-the military establishment has
searched for a justification, a raison d 'etre. 1 Thus far, it seems, the search has
produced mixed results, the negative aspects accentuated and exacerbated by
two uunwon" wars and-with vitiating currency-by the military's
potential use in places as disparate as the areas of the Arabian littoral and El
Salvador. The future portends a continued lack of any ultimate success. The
impact such an agonizing endeavor promises to have on the nation with
whose security this military establishment is charged-a nation barely two
hundred years old-could be immense.
The transition period marked much more than simply a p assage from a
frontier police force to a global instrument of power, and the period did not
begin in 1941. It had firm roots in the Great War of 1914-18, or as many
historians have come to perceive it accurately, in Act One of a two-act drama
that had an extended intermission. From April 1917 to September 1945, the
Amerkan military establishment evolved into a contradiction in the
American polity. After August 1945 the contradiction had become an
aberration as well. It was an aberration because it possessed ( though it did not
know quite what to do with) a destructive apparatus that threatened the
planned extinction of mankind, it was a contradiction because it endeavored
to perpetuate and indeed to institudonalize the gap between American ideals
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Jn conditions of super-power nuclear stand-off we have seen at least two wars and
many lesser incidents in which 1 by that definition, strategic bombing has been
successfully employed. For example, and constrained only by political consider
ations, it was employed against North Korea ln 1950-51. It was again employed with
conspicuous success against Hauoi and Haiphong in the Linebacker II Offensive of
December 1974. Cdr. Kerr may not sec that as a strategic attack. but the North
Vietnamese seem to have done so. A third and particularly interesting example of a
lower scale strategic attack was the Israeli air strike against the Iraqi nuclear fadh ty
in June 1981. The fact that this raid was made by a small number of aircraft and that
the two states were not at war by no means disqualifies this precise and highly
effective raid from the domain of s.trategic attack. The potentiaJ balance of power in
rhe who1c region may have been shifted by a stnke on a key industrial facility rather
than by any conventional dash of armies, Perhaps we need a new phrase to describe
this kind of air bombardment against targets other than super-power key points, and
( sugge'-t that 'theatre strategic attack' fits the bill.
We cannot foresee whether this or any other kind of strategic bombing will be
appropriate to wars in the future; but it is quite certain that neither the hiHory of the
Second World War nor the limited experience of the Falklands campaign rules it out,
Air Marshal M. J. Armitage, CBE, RAF

Warfare in the Fourth Dimension'
Sir:
One way to think of electromagnetic warfare is to look at warfare in general as a
thermodynamic process. The electromagnetic spectrum is used to transmit informa
tion, and the battle for the airw.1ves is really a comest for control of the flow of
information.
Because electromagnetic w:s1ves add, it is impo$sible to actuaHy destroy a signal.
Bur i clearly, the information content can be destroyed by jamming, This reduces the
information or increases the entropy, While EW is used to control the flow of
information in the electromagnetic spectrum, conventJOnal weapons are used to
create disorder {h1ercase entropy) in an opponent's tactical formations, logistic
systems, etc,
The view of warfare as a battle to maximize the information under one's control,
and to maximize the entropy of an opponent then logically follows, From thh point
of view, C 3 1 systems are critical in providing an information advantage. The quality
of our computer and s,1ftware systems becomes critical, because of the multiplier
effect that rhey produce in the control of information.
Conversely, an adversary with a sophistic;ite<l electronic warfare capability might
attack srratcgic targets with a jjsoft kill," This could include disruption of banking,
electric power distribution, air traffic cotitrol, and similar s.ystems. Actually, this
could be done in a clandestine manner, so that deniability could be maintained. The
1 See Lieut. Cdr, G. Guy Thomas, "Warfare in 1he fourth Dimc.nsi<m-ls.the Navy Rudy for it?f-fow
can the Navy Prepare for it?" in Nrw,1f WM (:.,/leg" R�v1rn,, January-February 1983, pp 16-2.'t
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PROJFE§§liON AL READING
though the book seems to promise more than it delivers, it is an
excellent reference work, topnotch for selected reading, and the only
reasonable historical source , , , for a line officer thrust into destroyer
modification, procurement or design, ..
jj

,

•

•

Vice

by
Admiral Thomas R, Weschler, US Navy (Retired)*

Friedman, Norman, U.S. Destroyers: Au lll•strated Desig11 History. Annapolis:
Naval Institute Press, 1982. 489pp. $46.95

T

his handsomely jacketed, but soberly covered, large book presents a
complete history of the design and detailed characteristics of every
destroyer type in the US Navy (covering a period of over 80 years), but it
does so in too many instances with a labored pedagogic style. This is in
contrast to a few chapters, less cluttered with such detail, that are alive with
the interplay between design discussion, final characteristics and wartime or
Fleet achievements, The author, in his acknowledgement, indicates that a
suggestion for a book showing the linkage between national strategy, naval
doctrine, and ship design was the genesis of this work. It is disappointing not
to have that intriguing suggestion fulfilled more adequately.
The book is distinguished by the fine black and white pictures and line
drawings of all the destroyer types discussed. They are presented
appropriately supporting the text, and help to enliven the book and provide a
pictorial continuity.
As a former program manager of the Spruance and Virginia classes, I can
attest to the great value of this book to anyone moving new into the area of
• Admiral Weschlcr was rhe DX/DXG Program Coordinator and a
Board).

OP36 (Ship Characteristics
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signature suppression. except with respect to DDG-51 and some pre
WWII designs, though these have been continual considerations.
It would have been good for the general reader to have been reminded
that ship procurement is but one aspect of ship cost. The costs of operations
and maintenance and those of manning equal or exceed those of
procurement. Thus every ship is bought three times or more. This provides
another perspective on such features as ease of maintenance, equipment
reliability, manning, and full economy. In this regard, the author notes that
the low efficiency of gas turbines was a consideration in earlier ship design.
The g reat improvement in the FT4 and particularly in the LM2500
(Spruance, Perry, and Ticonderoga classes) is not noted, though this was one of
the major factors in their selection, once distillate fuel became standard in
the Navy.
Overall, though the book seems to promise more than it delivers, it is an
excellent reference work, topnotch fo r selected reading, and the only
reasonable historical source or indoctrina tion medium for a line officer
thrust into destroyer modification, procurement or design.
------- ■-------

Bartell, Joyce J., ed. Th, Yankee M•riner
efforts, has several objectives. First, it
seeks to provide a history of the Ameri�
•nd S,apower: America', Cha/lmge of
can experience with the sea. Second, it
Ocean Spact, Los Angeles: University
of Southern California Press, 1982,
intends a tour d 'horizon as to the tota)
299pp. S20.00
impact American sea power has h ad in
Was there eve r a Yankee Mariner? If
the past and should have in the future.
And, fina11y. it attempts to offer an
so, is he still with us? And what are his
understanding of the importance of the
prospects for the future? These questions:
oceans for the future of the United
are the focus of this guide to the United
St.:i:tes. The editor and authors make a
States as a sea-faring nation. The book is
about American sea power, as defined in
valiant attempt, but fall short of cover
ing these fields as completely as they
the foreword by Dr. Don Walsh, o(Trieste
desired.
fame1 as "the sum total of all uses made of
the oceans: their living and non-Hving
This result is predestined by the nature
of the book i,self. It is a collection of
resources, the energy wrest ed from them,
papers presented at a conference held at
their use as avenues of transport, their
the University of Southern California in
value and potential for recreation, as well
March 1981, sponsored by the Center for
as the vital r ole they play in national
the Study of the American Experience,
defense.'' Walsh's is a theme much in
the Annenberg School of Communica
vogue these days. sounded perhaps most
tions. Some of the monograp hs trace the
forcefully by Admiral of the Fleet Sergei
development of the United States as a sea
Gorshkov in his book, The Sea Power ofthe
power from the histo rical point of view,
Stau, and highlighted by the perhaps
while others describe specific ocean uses
concluded negotiations at the Third UN
and the US prospects for future develop
Conference on the Law of the Sea.
ments in those areas, The denouement is
This book, like certain other recent
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1983
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thought better to avoid those problem,
area of conventional weapons. To at
that would arise as a result of seeking to
least one set of European eyes. the
alter the ABM Treaty. Arms negotia
contributors to this voJume represent the
tions will always constitute only one
acc eptable face of present-day
dimension of the broader Soviet-Ameri
American strategic thinking.
can relationship, but will be bound to be
affected by others. Linkage .. is also a
KEN BOOTH
University College of Walei,
problem for arms control negotiations
Aberystwyth
within the Western alliance, where the
stakes are now very high.
Feld, Werner J. and Wildgen, John K.
There lS therefore a political impera
NA TO and the Atlantic Defe•se: Percep·
tive for the United States to continue the
ti't:ms and !Uusions, New York: Praeger,
talb, making progress as circumstances
1982, 171pp. $19.95
permit; but it is essential to embed the
What is one to make of a book that
Intermediate Nuclear Force talks, as
confesses in the HAcknowledgements,''
soon as possible, in the broader context
before one has even seen the table of
of negotiations about all strategic forces,
contents, that "This text was written
The problem of the latter, unfortunately,
quickly ·.. , . "; that begins the last
is complicated by the "messy institu
chapter, called "Policy Implications,"
tional infrastructure., of arms control
by raising doubts" , . , with respect to
and the increasingly comp!icated polit
the cau sality between perceptlons,
ical setting. As a result, .. it is not easy to
attitudes 1 behavior and policy actions"
de?lne a coherent, constructive, and
after leading us down the garden path
politically sustain able a rms control
from the analysis of perceptions and
policy."
illusions in the first five chapters to the
Even so, it is argued that there is
policy implications of the last chapter;
nothing to gain from terminating SALT
that fills page after page with dearly
ll. Beyond that the Study Group believes
superfluous charts 1 graphs and even an
that there might be room for less formal
entire irrelevant chapter? One wonders
and less public arrangements when it
why the authors wrote it and why we
comes to the long�term future of stra
should read it. Where were the friendly
tegic arms control negotiations, while
colleague, who help authors through
unilateral efforts could be taken in the
early drafts and the professional editors
defense field which would further the
with their blue pencils?
basic aims of arms control. General
The authors wrote a good article that
expectations about arms control should
be lowered, Its future is not primarily
was stretched into a bad book. The good
article is the last and sixth chapter. It
hampered by "a lack of reasonable goals
or of potentially effective means of
shows flashes of insight into some of the
accomplishing them." Basically, arms
issues separating the United States from
its European allies, but it is unfortunate
control is "to a large degree hostage to
the srate of US-Soviet reJa.rions. • 1
that the best writing and most intelligent
commentary concentrated in the last
Overall, this is a sophisticated contri
bution to the debate about the future of
chapter highlight the bad writing, the
lack of organization and the questionable
US strategic forces. it deserves to be
read carefully and widely, and one looks
methods of the rest of the book. Chapter
six relies upon traditional analysis and
forward to a similar venture into the
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol36/iss3/32
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State University's Center for Nato
Studies, goes some distance toward
achieving its ambitious goal: to dose the
"scholarly publication gap" that exisn
between works on the Warsaw Pact and
those dealing with Nato. [t could have
succeeded with a somewhat shorter
volume, however; one that wa:s: both
more readable and less repetitious.
Tl1e Warsaw Pr1C1 is organized as an
encyclopedia of the Warsaw Pact, Its
major sections address "The Principal
Political Relationships," 'jNATO and
the Warsaw Pact/' "The Forces/' "The
Weapons," and "Doctrine and Capabil
ities," The initial section subjects the
reader to che same Htany of dates and key
events three times over, in Andrzej
Korbonski 's essay pretentiously entitled
"The Warsaw Treaty After Twenty
FJve Years: An Entangling Alliance or an
Empty Shell?",Jorg K. Hoensch's "The
Warsaw Pact and the Northern Member
States," and Edgar O'Ballance's "The
Three Southern Members of the Warsaw
Pact."
O'Rallancc has produce{I the most
cogent of the three pieces. It is relatively
free of unsupported assertions, which
particularly plague the Hoensch essay,
and provides valuable insights into the
neutralist tendencies of the southern tier
states. Sloppiness even creeps into
O'Ballance's work, however. For
example, there was no June 197:3 Middle
East War. The war in question was
DOV S, ZAKHElM
SpN'i,11 A��istant to the
fought In June 1967. More troubling is
Under t;;rcrt·tary of Defense
the
reference to participation of under
for Polky
strength Hun garian f orces and an
"ineffectual" Bulgarian contingent in
Clawson, Robert W. and Kaplan,
the crushing of Czechoslovakia. Hoemch
Lawrence S,, eds, The Warsaw Part:
asserts that "the Pact command
Poli1ical P11rposr awl Miliwry .Means.
pride itself on the mainly
could
,
W ilmington, Del.: Scharlarly Re
s;1tisfactory
coordination
o( the five partic�
sources, 1982. 297pp. $19.95 paper
ipant
forces
during
the
.
, the interven
$9.95
tion against a deviant Pact member."
This collection of conference papers,
The scctiou on Nato and the Warsaw
produced under the auspices of Kent
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1983
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published in January 1968 in support of
hls arguments that the Soviets view a
protracted conventional campaign as
improbable. Without doubt, at the time
the Soviets did not focus on the possibil
ities of a protracted conventional war.
Many analysts would argue, however,
that they do so today. Similarly, Miller
argues that the Soviets expect to launch
a preemptive nuclear strike, on the
basis of a comment by A.A. Sidorenko
published some years ago. Brezhnev's
110-first-use offer has, of course,
overtaken Miller's argument, at ]east at
its face value.
The polnr of the$c criticisms is not to
devalue MHler•s effort. His research is
indeed painstaking, even if the book
suffers from a variety of minor factual
errors and some poor proofreading.
Furthermore. Miller's arguments are
plausible, and arc supportable on the
basis of analyses that go beyond his
methodology, Most readers will recog
nize the limitations to Miller's method
ology, as the author himself adrnowl
cdges. Thus, for the general reader
wHling to plunge into heavily academic
prose, and for the speciali:H seeking a
well-organized discussion of the Soviet
military/political psyche, Miller',
book, in the genre of the seminal works
by Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., and
Amoretta M. Hoeber, is indeed re
quired reading,
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